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Abstract 
This paper exploits the significant recent variation in United States house prices to 
empirically examine the effect on housing equity constraints and nominal loss aversion on 
household mobility. The analysis uses unique, detailed data from 1985-1996 on household 
characteristics, mobility, and wealth from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) 
matched with house price data from 149 metropolitan areas to estimate semiparametric 
proportional hazard models of intra- and intermetropolitan mobility. There are five principal 
findings. First, household intrametropolitan own-to-own mobility responds differently to 
nominal housing losses than to gains. Second, nominal loss aversion is significantly less 
pronounced in intrametropolitan own-to-rent and intermetropolitan mobility, respectively. Third, 
there is some evidence of binding equity constraints in intrametropolitan own-to-own mobility. 
Fourth, there is little evidence that low equity constrains intrametropolitan own-to-rent and 
intermetropolitan mobility, respectively. Fifth, a comparison of the estimated effects indicates 
that nominal loss aversion has a more dominant effect than equity constraints in restricting 
household mobility, roughly two and one-half to three times the impact of equity constraints.  
I. Introduction 
Housing markets often exhibit behavior that cannot be explained by standard 
asset-market models (Poterba 1984). For example, they display rapid swings in prices, strong 
positive correlation of prices and trading volume over the housing cycle, and the observed 
reluctance of prospective sellers to reduce asking prices in down markets (Stein 1995; Genesove 
and Mayer 1997, 2001). An important part of recent research has been to propose and 
empirically test new theories that explain these puzzles. Two seemingly related but competing 
theories have emerged. The first is housing equity (or collateral) constraints, analyzed by Stein 
(1995), Genesove and Mayer (1997), Henley (1998a), Lamont and Stein (1999), Ortalo-Magne 
and Rady (1998), and Chan (2001), among others. The second, and quite provocative, theory is 
nominal loss aversion, analyzed first by Genesove and Mayer (2001).  
Although both theories rely on the same propagation—a decline in nominal house 
prices—they have distinctly different implications for housing market behavior and government 
policy. Equity constraints occur because of down payment requirements in mortgage lending. 
Specifically, because most home purchases are mortgage financed, housing is a highly leveraged 
asset. A nominal price decline can result in equity- (or down payment-) constrained households 
who cannot move, which decreases market demand and results in further price declines that 
further constrain household mobility. In addition, down payment requirements arise for a number 
of reasons (Engelhardt 1996b). First, households with equity in a home share with the lender the 
risk of a marketwide decline in house prices. Second, down payments reduce moral hazard in the 
maintenance of the home and its value. Third, down payments help curtail adverse selection from 
asymmetric information in the mortgage lending market. These reasons all point to some sort of 
market failure that, in principle, could be addressed through government policy to ease binding 
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equity constraints. In contrast, nominal loss aversion, whereby households are averse to realizing 
nominal housing market losses and, hence, treat gains and losses asymmetrically, is a 
characteristic of preferences, which typically are not thought of as affected by government policy 
instruments. 
This paper empirically examines the effect of equity constraints and nominal loss 
aversion on household mobility. The data used are on young homeowners from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). Young homeowners are an ideal group to study. They 
have high job and geographic mobility and are highly leveraged. They are the most susceptible to 
equity constraints to mobility. In addition, the analysis exploits the significant metropolitan 
variation in housing market performance in the United States for 1985-1996. This period 
encompasses the well-known recessions in the energy states, the Northeast, and California, as 
well as the rising economic tides in the South, Midwest, and Pacific Northwest. These data 
display rich variation in nominal losses and gains.  
Moreover, the data are unique. Detailed data on demographics, employment, and wealth 
come from the public-use version of the NLSY79. These were matched to administrative address 
data to construct mobility histories that are more detailed than those available from the restricted-
access NLSY79 Geocode data. In addition, housing value and mortgage data from the NLSY79 
master file were used. These data are top-coded on the public-use version of the data. The 
NLSY79 data were matched with weighted-repeat-sales house price indices for 149 metropolitan 
areas provided by the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). Analysis with data drawn from a broad 
sample of metropolitan areas is an important contribution of this paper, because most of the 
existing empirical analyses of equity constraints and nominal loss aversion used data from the 
New York metropolitan area (Chan 2001) and the downtown Boston condominium market 
(Genesove and Mayer 1997, 2001), respectively. 
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The final data set was used to estimate semiparametric proportional hazard models of 
intra- and intermetropolitan mobility. There are five primary findings. First, household 
intrametropolitan own-to-own mobility responds differently to nominal housing losses than to 
gains. Evaluated at the sample mean, having experienced a nominal gain reduced the baseline 
hazard of such a move by 37 percent. That is, households hold on to housing market gains. In 
contrast, having experienced a nominal loss reduced the baseline hazard of such a move by 27 
percent. That is, households hold on to housing market losses. In all specifications, gains are 
treated differently from losses. These effects were estimated controlling for equity constraints, so 
that these results may be interpreted as evidence of nominal loss aversion. These findings 
confirm those in Genesove and Mayer (2001), and complement the results of Engelhardt 
(1996a), who found evidence of the asymmetric treatment of nominal housing gains and losses 
on homeowner saving behavior. Second, nominal loss aversion is significantly less pronounced 
in intrametropolitan own-to-rent and intermetropolitan mobility, respectively. For these types of 
mobility, households hold on to nominal housing market gains, but losses have little economic 
and statistical effect on mobility. Third, there is some evidence of binding equity constraints in 
intrametropolitan own-to-own mobility (although weaker in a statistical sense than that for loss 
aversion). Evaluated at the sample mean, being a constrained household (with less than 20 
percent equity) reduced the baseline hazard of such a move by 11 percent. This complements the 
findings of Chan (2001) on mobility, as well as Caplin, Freeman, and Tracy (1997), who argued 
persuasively that low housing equity constrained residential mortgage refinancing, reduced 
consumption, and exacerbated regional recessions. Fourth, there is little evidence that low equity 
constrains intrametropolitan own-to-rent and intermetropolitan mobility, respectively. Fifth, a 
comparison of the estimated effects indicates that nominal loss aversion has a more dominant 
effect than equity constraints in restricting household mobility, roughly two and one-half to three 
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times the impact of equity constraints. This result complements the finding of Genesove and 
Mayer (2001) for the downtown Boston condominium market.  
The results in the current paper likely have some broader implications. In a provocative 
series of papers, Oswald (1996, 1997, 1999) has argued that housing market impediments in 
general can explain the significant cross-country differences in unemployment rates in the OECD 
countries, cross-regional differences in Britain and Canada, and cross-state differences in the 
United States.1  While it seems unlikely a priori that there is a single explanation for the 
unemployment problem, if Oswald’s hypothesis is correct, the implications are far-reaching. 
Because most countries intervene in housing markets heavily through tax subsidies to home 
ownership, rent control, public housing, zoning, growth restrictions, and mortgage market 
regulation, government housing policies could have significant labor market repercussions. 
Although the current paper was not intended as a direct test of the Oswald hypothesis, two 
results cast doubt on its relevance for the United States. First, low housing equity only appears to 
constrain homeowner mobility within metropolitan areas, but not between metropolitan areas. 
Second, homeowners who are not employed are significantly more likely to move between 
metropolitan areas. These results are inconsistent with Oswald (1996, 1997, 1999), but are not 
inconsistent with the influential work of Blanchard and Katz (1992), who argued that the primary 
mechanism for economic adjustment across regions in the United States is through the migration 
of labor, not the adjustment of market wages.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the economic relationship 
between housing equity, nominal loss aversion, and mobility, and discusses related empirical 
work from the literature. Section III discusses the data and preliminary analysis. Section IV 
outlines the hazard model specification. Section V discusses the estimation results. There is a 
brief conclusion.  
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II. Previous Literature 
The basic theory of equity constraints was laid out in Stein (1995) and is illustrated most 
clearly with an example. Consider a household that purchases a $100,000 home with a 
10 percent down payment.2 If house prices rise by 10 percent, the home is worth $110,000 and 
the household has $20,000 in equity (or 18.2 percent). For the same down payment requirement, 
the household could trade up significantly: it now could use that equity to purchase a $200,000 
home with 10 percent down. However, with a 10 percent decline in prices, the home is worth 
$90,000 and the household has no equity. The household could not make the down payment on 
the same home without other wealth.3 With no other wealth, the household cannot move and 
remain a homeowner.4  Thus, nominal house price changes can have asymmetric effects on 
mobility: households can lever capital gains to purchase larger homes, but they become 
constrained by capital losses.5 
 Stein (1995) formalized this intuition into a liquidity-based model of the housing market. 
He showed that this asymmetric effect can result in within-equilibrium housing market 
multipliers and multiple equilibria. These results hold even if constrained households have the 
option of moving and renting. The strength of the multipliers depended on the fraction of owners 
who were constrained movers—only in markets with a sufficiently large fraction of constrained 
owners could there be significant feedback effects to house prices.6 Ortalo-Magne and Rady 
(1998) have generalized Stein’s findings in an overlapping-generations framework.7 
 Recent research on Boston and New York has provided some evidence in support of 
equity constraints.8 One implication of Stein’s model is that constrained owners may “go 
fishing,” i.e., offer their houses for sale at an above market price that would allow a move in the 
(low probability) event that a buyer arrives to pay that price. Genesove and Mayer (1997) 
examined the effect of equity on the time-to-sale and listing behavior of potential sellers in the 
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downtown Boston condominium market. They found that constrained sellers (i.e., with less than 
20 percent equity) were more likely than unconstrained sellers to ask above market prices, and 
that this resulted in an inverse correlation between prices and time-to-sale.  
 Chan (2001) has provided the only direct evidence on equity and mobility in the United 
States. She examined the experience of homeowners in the New York metropolitan area with a 
unique data set of Chemical Bank adjustable-rate mortgages. She found that constrained 
households (i.e., less than 20 percent equity) experienced a 24 percent reduction in mobility 
relative to unconstrained owners in the four years after the decline in prices. Her study is 
noteworthy in that the mortgage data were of unusually high quality, with arguably no 
measurement error in the mortgage spell length and explanatory variables. A “move” was 
defined as a mortgage termination. Chan argued that ARM refinancing was rare because of a 
low-cost option of conversion to a fixed-rate loan at the market rate, and, as such, mortgage 
duration was a good proxy for residence duration. In addition, she provided evidence from public 
records that 95 percent of ARM terminations in her sample were from moves.9    
Nominal loss aversion is a central feature of the prospect theory of Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) have integrated nominal loss aversion into 
an asset pricing model that explains the large equity premium, volatility in expected returns, and 
level of average return in the stock market better than traditional consumption-based models. 
Genesove and Mayer (2001) were the first to examine nominal loss aversion in the housing 
market. The basic hypothesis is that homeowners treat gains and losses differently, and are 
reluctant to realize nominal losses; hence, they will set higher list prices and have longer time on 
the market in the hope that they will find a buyer with an offer high enough to attenuate the 
nominal loss. Genesove and Mayer (2001) used similar (but updated) data from the downtown 
Boston condominium market as in Genesove and Mayer (1997). However, in the updated 
analysis, they found that most of seller behavior seemed to be driven by nominal loss aversion. 
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Only about one-quarter of the effect of declining nominal house prices on listing, pricing, and 
time on the market in Boston operated through equity constraints. The estimates in Chan (2001) 
also suggested some nominal loss aversion in the New York area.  
III. Data and Preliminary Analysis 
 The data used in the current paper are unique and are described in detail in the appendix. 
The primary data cover the 1985-96 period and are from the public-use version of the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). These have been supplemented by data from three 
additional sources. First, administrative data on addresses were used to construct mobility 
histories for each household. This could not be done with data on the public-use and 
restricted-access Geocode files. Second, housing value and mortgage data from the NLSY79 
master file were used. These data are top-coded in the public use version. Finally, Fannie 
Mae/Freddie Mac weighted-repeat-sales metropolitan house price indices were matched to each 
household-year observation. The final sample consists of 6,461 household-year observations. 
Sample descriptive statistics are given in Table A-1 in the appendix. 
This sample has a number of advantages. First, it focuses on young households, many of 
whom own their first home. They are the most mobile and the most leveraged, and hence the 
most likely to be equity-constrained when house prices decline. This sets up a strong empirical 
test for equity constraints. If there is little evidence in favor of constraints in this sample, then 
equity is likely unimportant for mobility, because one would not expect it to affect the mobility 
of older, wealthier households. Alternatively, if there is evidence in favor of constraints, then 
equity is important for mobility, at least for young households.  
Second, the sample spans a period of substantial variation in metropolitan housing market 
performance that can be used to identify any equity and loss aversion effects. This is particularly 
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important for two reasons. First, the model and empirical work of Stein (1995) and Lamont and 
Stein (1999) on equity constraints has indicated the possibility of multiple equilibria, such that 
equity constraints may be at play in some metropolitan areas, but not others. Second, while both 
the empirical tests by Genesove and Mayer (1997, 2001) and Chan (2001) for equity constraints 
and loss aversion used incredibly rich data and have provided very persuasive evidence in favor 
of these phenomena, in the end, they apply only to the experiences of the condominium market 
in downtown Boston and the greater New York metropolitan area housing market. A question of 
first-order importance is whether these results generalize to the nation as a whole. This is 
especially important if, as outlined in the introduction, a main concern is that housing markets 
constrain mobility between metropolitan areas. Studies of single metropolitan areas cannot 
address this broader economic question.  
Third, there are standard omitted variables issues. Previous studies have not been able to 
track changes in the demographic and economic circumstances of the households under study 
that almost surely affect mobility behavior strongly and may happen to be correlated with local 
housing and labor market conditions.10  These include divorce, unemployment, and family 
decisions. Thus, another key question is whether once one controls for these other factors, 
evidence of equity constraints and loss aversion remains. 
From the discussion in the previous section, there are many requirements for equity 
constraints to bind. First, most wealth must be in housing. If the household in the example above 
had $10,000 in other wealth and house prices fell 10 percent, the household would not be 
constrained because it could use its other wealth to make a down payment. Empirically, highly 
leveraged households are predominantly young, first-time owners with little other wealth. 
Table 1 shows the fraction of wealth in housing at the time of first home purchase for a sample 
of NLSY79 households. Overall, 80.5 and 90.6 percent of liquid assets go into housing at 
purchase, at the mean and median, respectively. Column (3) indicates that 25 percent of first-
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time homebuyers essentially have no other wealth after first purchase. These figures are higher 
when wealth is measured as liquid assets less debts. 
 Second, periods of declining nominal house prices are required for binding equity 
constraints, and, obviously, for nominal loss aversion.11   Table 2 summarizes recent episodes of 
falling prices for selected United States metropolitan areas (grouped geographically). These 
episodes were measured using the Freddie Mac/Fannie Mae price indices described above. Price 
declines have been quite large. In Houston, there was a 27 percent decline from the market peak 
to the trough (Column 3). Peak-to-trough declines of 15 percent or more occurred in Texas, New 
England, and Southern California. These declines were large enough to have constrained most 
owners with less than 20 percent equity at the market peak. 
 Third, house prices must decline sufficiently rapidly for equity constraints to bind. If not, 
forward-looking owners could increase saving to maintain the option of purchasing another 
home.12  The market peaks and troughs indicated in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 show that the 
duration of price declines has varied greatly. For example, the declines in Texas and New York 
lasted 2 to 3 years. In contrast, prices declined for five and seven years in California and 
Connecticut, respectively. To control for declines of different duration, Column (4) presents the 
annual average decline from peak to trough. By this metric, house prices declined rapidly, an 
annual average rate of 4.5-10 percent in the energy states, for example. Because many owners 
have 10 percent equity at purchase, these declines may have constrained a large number of 
households within one year.13 
Table 3 examines the effect of falling nominal house prices on the distribution of housing 
equity in the NLSY79 sample. Panel A, Column (1) describes equity in the purchase year for all 
observations: 55.2 percent of owners had 20 percent or more in equity, 20.5 percent had between 
10 and 19 percent equity, and 24.3 percent had less than 10 percent equity. Viewing the spell 
data as an (unbalanced) panel, Column (2) shows contemporaneous equity. As expected, equity 
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grows over time: 63.1 percent of owners had 20 percent or more, 23.5 percent had between 10 
and 19 percent, and just 13.4 percent had less than 10 percent. 
Equity growth can come from a decline in mortgage debt through normal repayment, full 
or partial prepayment, and house price appreciation. Columns (3) and (4) repeat the tabulations 
in Columns (1) and (2) for the metropolitan areas with stable or rising housing markets, 
respectively. Columns (5) and (6) are defined similarly for the metropolitan areas with weak 
housing markets. A comparison of Columns (3) and (4) to (5) and (6) clearly illustrates the effect 
of appreciation. In falling markets, the distribution of equity shifts toward low equity between 
the initial and current periods. In stable and rising markets, the distribution shifts toward greater 
equity. Rising prices confer positive shocks; falling house prices confer negative shocks. 
Because housing is the largest component of non-pension household wealth, house price 
fluctuations can have a large impact on the overall household balance sheet. Column (1) in panel 
B describes net worth relative to home value in the purchase year for all observations: 81.4 
percent had net worth of 20 percent or more, 10.7 percent had between 10 and 19 percent, and 
7.9 percent had less than 10 percent. Column (2) shows the contemporaneous ratio. As expected, 
net worth grows over time: 84.8 percent had 20 percent or more, 8.0 percent had between 10 and 
19 percent, and just 7.2 percent had less than 10 percent. A comparison of Columns (3) and (4) 
with (5) and (6) clearly illustrates the effect of appreciation. In weak markets, the distribution of 
net worth remains very close between the initial and current periods. In stable and rising markets, 
the distribution shifts toward more net worth. Again, weak markets confer negative shocks to the 
whole balance sheet. 
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IV. Hazard Model Specification 
 To test for the presence of equity constraints and nominal loss aversion more formally, 
proportional hazard models of mobility are estimated. The 6,461 household-year observations 
described in the sample above comprise 3,112 residence spells. The sample has no left-censored 
spells. The longest (right-censored) spell is 12 years. Because intra- and intermetropolitan 
moves, as well as transitions between home owning and renting, have different determinants 
(Boehm, Herzog, and Schlottmann 1991; Bartel 1979), three possible transitions are studied: 
intrametropolitan moves from own-to-own, intrametropolitan moves from own-to-rent, and 
intermetropolitan moves. In particular, intrametropolitan moves typically are to adjust housing 
consumption; intermetropolitan moves typically are in response to employment changes.14  Of 
the 3,112 spells, 895 were completed (i.e., ended in a move): 596 intrametropolitan own-to-own, 
174 intrametropolitan own-to-rent; and, 125 intermetropolitan, respectively.  
 Figure 1 shows the Kaplan-Meier empirical hazards for each type of move. The hazard 
for intrametropolitan own-to-own moves rises and falls across spell periods, with peaks at almost 
15 percent in year five and 4 percent in year eight. The shape of this hazard is similar to those in 
Sinai (1997), who used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and Chan (2001), who 
used Chemical Bank mortgage records. This is not inconsistent with young homeowners making 
lifecycle adjustments to housing consumption by trading up, perhaps to accommodate an 
increase in family size (Henderson and Ioannides 1989). The hazards for the other types of 
moves are remarkably flat across spell periods.  
 The econometric analysis employs a proportional hazard model of mobility, defined as a 
transition out of the current residence spell. Let i  index households and t  spell periods; then the 
hazard, λ , which measures the probability of moving in period t conditional on having not yet 
moved, is  
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)exp(0 βλλ ′= ittit Z ,                    (1) 
where 0λ  is the baseline hazard and Z  is a vector of explanatory variables.  
 The household’s home equity stake is measured by the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. A high 
LTV means low equity. Mortgage underwriting guidelines suggest that households with an LTV 
greater than 0.80 (i.e., less than 20 percent equity) might be constrained. Mortgages with less 
than 20 percent down require the purchase of private mortgage insurance (PMI), which is 
expensive, 0.75 percentage points applied to the entire mortgage, not just the increment of the 
mortgage that would bring the down payment up to the 20 percent level.15  Initially, all 
households with an LTV greater than 0.80, or less than 20 percent in equity, are considered 
constrained in the empirical analysis. This is the same definition used by Genesove and Mayer 
(1997, 2001), Lamont and Stein (1999), Caplin, Freeman, and Tracy (1997), and Chan (2001). 
Later, robustness checks will be performed with an LTV of 0.90 to define constrained 
households.16  
 Following Genesove and Mayer (2001), the basic specification is: 
)()()( 80.0 it
GAIN
itit
LOSS
itit
LTV
ititit GAINDLOSSDLTVDXZ ×+×+×+
′
=
′ > δγθαβ , (2) 
where 80.0>LTVitD  is a dummy variable that equals one if LTV was greater than 0.80 and zero 
otherwise, and indicates whether the household is in the constrained group; LOSSitD  is a dummy 
variable that is one if the household has experienced a nominal loss in house price in current 
period t  relative to the initial purchase period 0; LOSS  measures this nominal loss in percentage 
terms and expresses it as a positive number (e.g., for a 5 percent nominal loss, LOSS  takes on a 
value of 0.05); GAINitD  is a dummy variable that is one if the household has experienced a 
nominal gain in house price in current period t  relative to the initial purchase period 0; GAIN  
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measures this nominal gain in percentage terms (e.g., for a 5 percent nominal gain, GAIN  takes 
on a value of 0.05); and X  is a vector of other explanatory variables.  
The parameters in Equation (2) are interpreted as follows. First, θ  is the effect of being 
equity constrained (conditional on X) on the hazard of moving. If constrained households have a 
lower hazard and, hence, a longer duration, then 0<θ . Therefore, the simplest test for equity 
constraints implies a null hypothesis of 0=θ . For intrametropolitan own-to-own moves, the 
alternative hypothesis is 0<θ , i.e., lock-in. Importantly, because of the interaction of 80.0>LTVD  
and ,LTV  Equation (2) says that it is not just whether the household has a high loan-to-value 
ratio (low equity), but also the magnitude of the equity that matters, so that 0<θ  means that the 
larger the LTV (lower the equity) above the 0.80 threshold, the greater the reduction in the hazard 
of moving.17  For intrametropolitan own-to-rent moves, the alternative hypothesis is 0>θ , (i.e., 
switch tenure to mitigate the effect of the constraint). For intermetropolitan moves, the 
alternative is somewhat ambiguous, especially if most intermetropolitan moves are job-related 
and effectively exogenous to local housing market conditions. If low equity constrains these 
moves, then the alternative is 0<θ . Alternative explanations may make 0>θ  more plausible, 
e.g., if poor local economic conditions result in declining house prices, equity constraints, and, in 
response, constrained households more vigorously pursue opportunities in other metropolitan 
areas. 
 Second, γ  is the effect of the size of the nominal loss on the hazard of moving for 
households with nominal losses. Therefore, under the null hypothesis of no nominal loss 
aversion, 0=γ . With the alternative hypothesis of loss aversion, 0<γ , which implies that the 
larger the loss, the lower the hazard of moving, and the longer the duration in the current 
residence.18  Third, δ  is the effect of the size of the nominal gain on the hazard of moving for 
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households with nominal gains. Therefore, under the null hypothesis that nominal gains and 
losses are treated symmetrically, γδ −=  (because the loss variable takes on positive values).  
Unfortunately, there are potentially serious econometric problems if observed LTV is 
used in Equation (2). First, observed LTV is likely endogenous. For example, a household that 
expects a long duration may be more likely to renovate, which would increase value and 
decrease LTV, ceteris paribus. In addition, if these renovations were financed with home equity 
borrowing, then mortgage debt would increase. More generally, any factor that affects the time 
path of mortgage debt may depend on expected duration, which would render LTV endogenous.  
 Second, there may be measurement error in mortgage debt and house value. In an 
interesting study, Goodman and Ittner (1992) used panel data on housing structures from the 
American Housing Survey and compared homeowners’ self-reported estimates of the value of 
their homes with subsequent sale price of the home. They found that homeowners systematically 
overestimated the value of their home by 10 percent, but, somewhat surprisingly, this error was 
not correlated with any measured structural or household characteristics. Because the home value 
data in the NLSY79 are self-reported estimates, there is reason to believe there is reporting error 
in home values. In addition, a careful examination of the NLSY79 data shows that reported 
house and mortgage values were electronically miscoded from the interview information in some 
cases. The most typical coding error stems from the omission of the last digit of a reported home 
value or mortgage. For example, the same home worth $100,000 in one year is coded as being 
worth only $10,000 in the next year, followed by $100,000 in the subsequent year. Naturally, this 
means that in a large portion of the variation in LTV across time is due to measurement error. 
 To address endogeneity and measurement error, I define “simulated” LTV, denoted 
*LTV . It is the loan-to-value ratio the household would have if it made regular payments on a 
30-year fixed rate mortgage, never refinanced, and received the average metropolitan area 
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appreciation (measured by the Freddie/Fannie indices). Specifically, simulated LTV for 
household i  in metropolitan area a in spell period t  is   
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MLTV ,             (3) 
where 0M , 0V , and 0r  are the mortgage principal, interest rate, and house value in the year of 
purchase. 00 /VM  is just the initial loan-to-value. I  is an index of cumulative nominal house 
price appreciation in the metropolitan area between the purchase year (i.e., beginning of the 
spell), time 0, and the current spell period, time t . It has a value of 1 in the purchase year. If 
1<I , then nominal house prices have fallen since purchase, which will cause simulated LTV to 
rise. The opposite holds for 1>I , which represents nominal housing appreciation. The variable 
0r  is assumed to be the nominal 30-year fixed rate mortgage interest rate in the year of purchase. 
T is the term of the mortgage, assumed to be 30 years. The factor  
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represents the rate of amortization of the mortgage principal, .M  
 Simulated LTV can be thought of as an instrumental variable. Because it is based on 
initial LTV, it is constructed to purge any endogeneity in the subsequent time paths of mortgage 
balance and house value that could affect the numerator and/or denominator of the observed 
LTV. It is highly correlated with observed LTV (the sample correlation coefficient is 0.86). In 
addition, it varies independently across individuals in the sample because households with 
different loan-to-value at purchase experienced different metropolitan area appreciation. Under 
the assumption that each household is a price-taker in the housing market, variation in 
metropolitan area appreciation is exogenous to a given household’s mobility decision. 
Furthermore, simulated LTV is based on the loan-to-value in the year of purchase. A reporting 
error by the survey respondent with regard to total mortgage debt and house value in the 
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purchase year is unlikely because the household went through the mortgage application and 
closing process prior to the NLSY79 interview for that year. In addition, by construction, 
simulated LTV will be uncorrelated with electronic coding error in the NLSY79 in the years 
subsequent to the purchase year. Hence, simulated LTV circumvents measurement error.  
In the specifications reported below, simulated LTV is used in place of observed LTV in  
Equation (2). Thus, the specifications should be thought of as reduced-form relationships. 
Hereafter, the term “LTV” will refer to simulated LTV just described. 
V. Estimation Results 
The semiparametric estimator of Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) and Meyer (1988, 1990) 
is used, which models the baseline hazard flexibly as a vector of dummy variables, one for each 
spell period. Estimation results for intrametropolitan moves from own to own are shown in Table 
4. Column 1 shows parameter estimates for Equation (2) with no household demographic or 
financial characteristics. Standard errors are in parentheses. Here, θˆ  is -0.166. The p-value for 
the test of the null hypothesis of no equity constraint versus the alternative of equity constraint is 
0.049 and is shown in square brackets under the standard error. Because of the proportional 
hazard specification, this parameter estimate implies that binding equity constraints shift the 
baseline hazard downward by 13.9 percent when evaluated at the sample mean LTV for those in 
the constrained group. This is shown at the bottom of the table. Specifically, the sample mean 
LTV for those households in the constrained groups (i.e., with LTV greater than 0.80) was 0.905. 
The estimated percentage shift in the baseline hazard was calculated as  
1)]ˆ[exp( −×
C
LTVθ ,                 (5) 
where 
C
LTV  is the sample mean LTV for the sub-sample with 180.0 =>LTVD , i.e., the constrained 
group.  
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Next, γˆ  is -5.010. The p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that losses have no 
effect on mobility versus the alternative that losses reduce mobility as implied by nominal loss 
aversion is 0.0001. Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected in favor of loss aversion. This 
parameter estimate implies that losses shift the baseline hazard downward by 41.6 percent when 
evaluated at the sample mean loss for those with losses of 0.054 (i.e., a 5.4 percent nominal loss). 
Also, δˆ  is -9.872 and, based on the standard error, is significantly different from zero at the 
 0.01 percent level. This implies that households who experienced gains had lower hazards of 
intrametropolitan own-to-own moves and longer residence spells. When evaluated at the sample 
mean gain for those with gains of 0.135 (i.e., a 13.5 percent nominal gain), this estimate implies 
that gains shift the baseline hazard downward by 49.6 percent. Therefore, households hold on to 
gains. The fact that households hold on to both gains and losses suggests that households treat 
gains and losses asymmetrically.19  This is confirmed by the formal statistical test of the null 
hypothesis that γδ −= , the p-value for which is 0.0001 and shown at the bottom of the table. 
Hence, the hypothesis can be rejected in favor of the alternative of asymmetric treatment of gains 
and losses, consistent with nominal loss aversion. Finally, a comparison of the estimated effects 
at the bottom of the table indicates that loss aversion is about three times (i.e., 41.6/13.9=2.99) 
more important than equity constraints in affecting intrametropolitan own-to-own mobility. 
It is very likely that there are other characteristics of households that may be correlated 
with the loan-to-value and nominal loss that influence the hazard of moving. Therefore, in 
Column (2), a vector of demographic characteristics is added. These variables include dummy 
variables for whether the household is married, divorced, not employed, and white, respectively; 
dummy variables for whether the household head is 30 to 34 and 35 to 39 years old, respectively; 
and dummy variables for educational attainment.20  Finally, there are dummy variables for 
whether there are children of various ages: age 5 or under, 6 to 10, 11 to 18, and more than 18 
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years old, respectively. These dummies are particularly important. Households with school-age 
children are thought to be less mobile.  
Column (2) of Table 4 shows parameter estimates for Equation (2) with the demographic 
characteristics. Now, θˆ  is -0.150. The p-value for the test of the null hypothesis of no equity 
constraints versus the alternative of equity constraints is 0.068. In addition, there is still 
statistically significant evidence of loss aversion. Its effect on mobility is still about three times 
that of equity constraints. As expected, households with pre-school-age children have higher 
mobility. Given the importance of the quality of public schools in location decisions in a 
metropolitan area, these households may be moving to get into a suitable school district. Older, 
married, and more educated households have lower hazards of moving to another 
owner-occupied house in the same metropolitan area.21  
The equity-constraints hypothesis focuses on the ability of the household to make a down 
payment on a desired home. But households contemplating a move must also be able to meet the 
flow cost of housing services out of their income. Although the hypothesis does not address this 
directly, it is important to control for it in the estimation. Therefore, in Column (3), a dummy 
variable that is one if the household would be “housing expenditure-constrained” and zero 
otherwise appears. This variable is meant to capture the flow cost of housing services relative to 
income. This is measured as the user cost of owner-occupied housing multiplied by house value, 
then divided by income. The household is considered constrained if this flow cost is more than 
one-third of household income.22 The construction of this measure is described in detail in the 
appendix. Real income and net worth are added to the specification as well. 
Column (3) shows parameter estimates for Equation (2) with the demographic and 
financial characteristics. Now, θˆ  is -0.132. However, the p-value for the test of the null 
hypothesis of no equity constraints is 0.105, so that the finding of equity constraints is no longer 
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significant at the 5 percent level. In contrast, there continues to be statistically significant and 
economically important evidence of nominal loss aversion. Not surprisingly, households who 
currently are housing expenditure-constrained have significantly lower hazards of moving to 
another owner-occupied home in the same metropolitan area. The specification in Column (3) 
also controls for income and net worth directly. Conditional on the dummy for being expenditure 
constrained and the demographic characteristics, it does not appear that income and wealth have 
independent influences on the hazard of this type of move.23 
One criticism of the specification in Equation (2) is that the implications for nominal loss 
aversion are drawn from the GAIN and LOSS variables that may just reflect local labor market 
conditions (Chan 2001). For example, metropolitan areas with good local labor markets also 
have stable or rising nominal house prices, so the finding that households hold on to gains just 
may reflect the fact that households with gains are in areas with good labor market opportunities 
that are valued enough so that households stay in those areas. Therefore, to insure that the 
estimates for the GAIN and LOSS parameters are not contaminated by unaccounted local labor 
market conditions, Column (4) includes the unemployment rate for the county of residence as an 
explanatory variable. This has the effect of reducing the parameter estimates for the GAIN and 
LOSS variables, but by a relatively small amount. Again, there is relatively weak statistical 
evidence for equity constraints but strong evidence for nominal loss aversion. Loss aversion 
continues to be about three times more important than equity constraints in its impact on 
mobility.  
In Table 4, an LTV greater than 0.80, or less than 20 percent in equity, was used to define 
the constrained group. This follows Genesove and Mayer (1997, 2001), Lamont and Stein 
(1999), Caplin, Freeman, and Tracy (1997), and Chan (2001). However, with the increased 
promotion of mortgages with down payments of less than 20 percent in the sample period, it may 
be that many households with low equity were not actually constrained. Thus, Table 5 repeats 
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the specifications in Table 4 for intrametropolitan, own-to-own moves, but defines low-equity 
households as those with a loan-to-value of 0.90 or higher. This is a stricter measure of the 
equity constraint than is used by others in the literature. Qualitatively, the results are quite 
similar. There is statistically significant evidence of equity constraints, but its precision weakens 
as more explanatory variables are added.24  In addition, there is significant evidence of nominal 
loss aversion, and nominal aversion dominates equity constraints in impact by a ratio of about 
2.5:1.  
Table 6 gives estimation results for the same specifications in Table 4 but for 
intrametropolitan, own-to-rent moves. Based on the p-values shown in the first row of the table, 
the null hypothesis of no equity constraints for moves from own to rent in a metropolitan area 
cannot be rejected. This is true for all specifications. In addition, once the additional 
demographic and financial covariates are accounted for, there is no statistically significant effect 
of nominal losses on the hazard of this type of move (Columns (2) through (4)). Consistently, 
being white, married, more educated, older, wealthier, not housing-constrained, and having 
experienced nominal housing gains all reduce the likelihood of an own-to-rent move. The age of 
children does not matter for intrametropolitan own-to-rent mobility. 
Table 7 gives estimation results for the same specifications in Tables 4 and 6 but for 
intermetropolitan moves. Based on the p-values shown in the first row of the table, the null 
hypothesis of no equity constraints for moves from own to rent in a metropolitan area cannot be 
rejected. This is true for all specifications. Nor is there evidence for loss aversion. Consistently, 
being married and older reduce the likelihood of an intermetropolitan move, while having a 
college degree and being unemployed increase the likelihood of such a move. The facts that 
equity constraints do not hinder intermetropolitan mobility and that those not employed are more 
likely to move between metropolitan areas cast some doubt on the hypothesis that housing 
markets retard labor migration in the United States (Oswald 1996, 1997, 1999). 
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VI. Conclusion  
The empirical analysis yielded five principal findings. First, household intrametropolitan 
own-to-own mobility responds differently to nominal housing losses than to gains. These effects 
were estimated controlling for equity constraints, so that these results may be interpreted as 
evidence of nominal loss aversion. These findings confirm those in Genesove and Mayer (2001), 
and complement the results of Engelhardt (1996a), who found evidence of the asymmetric 
treatment of housing gains and losses on homeowner saving behavior. Second, nominal loss 
aversion is significantly less pronounced in intrametropolitan own-to-rent and intermetropolitan 
mobility, respectively. Third, there is some evidence of binding equity constraints in 
intrametropolitan own-to-own mobility (although it is weaker in a statistical sense than that for 
loss aversion). This complements the findings of Chan (2001) on mobility and Caplin, Freeman, 
and Tracy (1997) on mortgage refinancing. Fourth, there is little evidence that low equity 
constrains intrametropolitan own-to-rent and intermetropolitan mobility, respectively. Fifth, a 
comparison of the estimated effects indicates that nominal loss aversion has a more dominant 
effect than equity constraints in restricting household mobility:,roughly two and- one-half to 
three times the impact of equity constraints. This result complements the finding of Genesove 
and Mayer (2001) for the downtown Boston condominium market.  
The labor-market implications are somewhat mixed. First, the fact that intrametropolitan 
own-to-rent and intermetropolitan moves are not constrained suggests that declining housing 
equity due to falling nominal prices does not impede regional labor market adjustment 
necessarily. This is inconsistent with Oswald (1996, 1997, 1999), but not Blanchard and Katz 
(1992). On the other hand, because intrametropolitan moves for those who wish to remain 
homeowners are constrained, there might be some locationally mismatched workers within a 
metropolitan area. The magnitude of this potential welfare loss is unclear, and its estimate is far 
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beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, if intrametropolitan moves are primarily to adjust 
housing consumption, then constrained households are worse off from declining prices, but there 
will be little labor market impact. Alternatively, if such moves are contemplated to take 
employment in another part of the metropolitan area, to which commuting from the current 
residence would be prohibitively costly, then there could be some labor market distortions. Some 
of the literature on joint housing, employment, and commuting choice suggests that homeowners 
are more willing to take on a longer commute for a new job than to change residences within a 
metropolitan area. This suggests that intrametropolitan labor market distortions from declining 
equity may not be large. This is a clear avenue for future research.  
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Appendix 
This appendix describes the construction of the data set. The primary data cover the 
1985-96 period and are from the 1985-1998 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY79). Engelhardt (1998) and Zagorsky (1999) discussed the quality of these data. Haurin, 
Hendershott, and Kim (1994) and Haurin, Hendershott, and Wachter (1996, 1997) have used 
these data to analyze housing decisions of young households. The NLSY79 started as a national, 
stratified, random sample of 14 to 21 year-olds in 1979. The survey was conducted every year 
from 1979 to 1994; after 1994, it was conducted every two years. It asked detailed questions 
about education, employment, income, home ownership, family background, etc. In 1985, 
questions about assets and debts were added, including mortgage debt and home value. Because 
home ownership status has been asked each year since 1985, it is possible to completely track 
residence transitions from early adulthood. As a result, the sample has no left-censored spells. 
This means that the earliest a spell could have begun and been included in the sample is 1985. In 
turn, the longest spell observable with these data is 12 years. A potential criticism of this sample 
is that the distribution of completed residence spells may be poorly estimated if the average spell 
length of homeowners of this age is greater than 12 years, the maximum spell length in the 
sample. Sinai (1997) studied housing mobility for homeowners of all ages in the 1970-91 waves 
of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). His analysis showed that the hazards for 
homeowners declined steadily for spells of 10 years or less. For spells greater than 10 years, the 
hazards were roughly flat for all types of transitions. In addition, he estimated the average 
duration for a homeowner as 6.8 years. Under the assumption that young homeowners (age 20 to 
41 in my sample) have shorter completed spells than the average-aged homeowner in Sinai’s 
analysis—which seems plausible—then the NLSY79 sample may estimate the underlying spell 
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distribution well. In addition, Sinai presented sensitivity analyses that showed that truncation of 
the spell length at 8 years had little effect on the hazard estimates. 
Mobility Histories  
The empirical analysis focuses on three possible transitions: intrametropolitan moves 
from own to own, intrametropolitan moves from own to rent, and intermetropolitan moves. 
Unlike other panel studies, such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the NLSY79 
did not ask a question each year about whether the respondent had moved since the previous 
interview. The public-use version of the NLSY79 has information on home ownership in each 
year. Hence all own-to-rent moves can be tracked in this data set. The restricted-access Geocode 
dataset gives information on state, county, and the metropolitan area of residence. When 
combined, the public-use and Geocode data can track own-to-rent and intercounty moves. 
Unfortunately, intracounty own-to-own moves cannot be tracked. Because most moves are local, 
and most metropolitan areas are comprised of just a few (and, in some cases, one) counties, the 
combined public-use and Geocode data significantly understate the number of actual transitions. 
To overcome this problem, I obtained permission from the United States Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, to use administrative address data on the NLSY79 respondents in 
each survey year to construct a mobility history for each respondent. These mobility data were 
provided graciously by Patricia Reagan, who assembled them at the Center for Human Resources 
Research at the Ohio State University. When comparing the county of residence from the address 
records to that in the Geocode file, a number of errors were found in the Geocode data. All state 
and county codes used in this study were based on the administrative address records.  
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Metropolitan House Price Indices 
 Because the empirical analysis focuses on the effect of house prices on mobility, only 
respondents in metropolitan areas with available house price information were included in the 
sample. Metropolitan house prices were measured by the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Weighted 
Repeat Sales Price index. This index is discussed in detail in Abraham and Hendershott (1992). 
This is available in the 1985-96 period for the following 149 metropolitan areas: Akron, OH; 
Albany, NY; Albuquerque, NM; Allentown, PA; Ann Arbor, MI; Appleton, WI; Atlanta, GA; 
Atlantic-Cape May, NJ; Augusta, GA; Austin, TX; Bakersfield, CA; Baltimore, MD; 
 Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA; Baton Rouge, LA; Bellingham, WA; Birmingham, AL; 
Bloomington-Normal, IL; Boston, MA; Boulder-Longmont, CO; Bridgeport, CT; Brockton, MA; 
Buffalo, NY; Burlington, VT; Canton-Massillon, OH; Cedar Rapids, IA; 
 Charleston-North Charleston, SC; Charlotte, NC; Chicago, IL; Cincinnati, OH; Cleveland, OH; 
Colorado Springs, CO; Columbia, SC; Columbus, OH; Dallas, TX; Danbury, CT; 
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IL; Dayton-Springfield, OH; Daytona Beach, FL; Denver, CO; 
Des Moines, IA; Detroit, MI; Eugene-Springfield, OR; Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY; Flint, MI; 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO; Fort Lauderdale, FL; Fort Wayne, IN; Fort Worth-Arlington, TX; 
Fresno, CA; Gary, IN; Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI; Green Bay, WI; 
Greensboro-Winston-Salem-High Point, NC; Greenville-Spartanburg, SC; 
Hamilton-Middletown, OH; Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA; Hartford, CT; Houston, TX; 
Huntsville, AL; Indianapolis, IN; Jacksonville, FL; Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI; Kansas City, 
MO; Knoxville, TN; Lancaster, PA; Lansing-East Lansing, MI; Las Vegas, NV; Lawrence, 
MA-NH; Lexington, KY; Lincoln, NE; Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR; Los Angeles, CA; 
Orange County, CA; Riverside, CA; Louisville, KY; Lowell, MA-NH; Madison, WI; 
Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL; Memphis, TN-AR-MS; Miami, FL; 
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Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI; Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN; Modesto, CA; Monmouth-Ocean, NJ; 
Nashua, NH; Nashville, TN; New Haven-Meriden, CT; New Orleans, LA; New York, NY; 
Bergen-Passaic, NJ; Newark, NJ; Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ; Nassau-Suffolk, NY; 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA; Oklahoma City, OK; Omaha, NE; Orlando, FL; 
Peoria, IL; Philadelphia, PA; Phoenix-Mesa, AZ; Pittsburgh, PA; Portland, ME; 
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA; Portsmouth-Rochester, NH-ME; Providence-Fall River, RI-MA; 
Provo-Orem, UT; Racine, WI; Raleigh-Durham, NC; Reading, PA; Reno, NV; Richmond, VA; 
Rochester, NY; Rockford, IL; Sacramento, CA; Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI; St. Louis, MO; 
Salem, OR; Salinas, CA; Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT; San Antonio, TX; San Diego, CA; 
San Francisco, CA; Oakland, CA; San Jose, CA; San Luis Obispo, CA; Santa Barbara, CA; 
Santa Cruz, CA; Santa Rosa, CA; Sarasota-Bradenton, FL; Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA; 
Springfield, IL; Springfield, MA; Stamford-Norwalk, CT; Stockton, CA; Syracuse, NY; 
Tacoma, WA; Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL; Toledo, OH; Trenton, NJ; Tucson, AZ; 
Tulsa, OK; Vallejo, CA; Ventura, CA; Visalia-Porterville-Tulare, CA; Washington, 
DC-MD-VA; West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL; Wichita, KS; Wilmington-Newark, DE-MD; 
Worcester, MA; and York, PA. 
Income 
The household income measure used is real total net family income (in 1993 dollars). 
Interviews typically were conducted in the spring of the calendar year. The survey asked about 
income earned in the previous calendar year. For example, the 1993 wave contains information 
on 1992 income. This means that the 1986 to 1994 surveys provide information on income in 
calendar years 1985 to 1993. After 1994, the survey went to an every-other-year format, but 
questions on income still referred to the previous calendar year. This means that the 1996 survey 
year gives information on calendar year 1995 income, and the 1998 survey year gives 
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information on calendar year 1997 income. Incomes from calendar years 1994 and 1996 were 
not asked. Therefore, for this study, income for calendar years 1995 and 1997 proxy for those in 
1994 and 1996, respectively. All income values in the paper are in real 1993 dollars, deflated by 
the All-Items CPI. 
House Value and Mortgage Data 
The public use NLSY79 top-coded housing value and mortgage debt at $150,000 in 
nominal terms for the 1985 to 1994 waves (Engelhardt 1998). Initial loan-to-value cannot be 
calculated for observations with top-coded values, and these observations must be excluded from 
the sample. In 1985, less than 2 percent of observations had top-coded values for house value 
and mortgage debt. But because the top-code threshold was fixed in nominal terms, over time 
with inflation, a growing fraction of observations had top-coded values: 17.38 percent for 
housing value and 6.35 percent for mortgage debt in 1994, respectively. However, because of the 
substantial regional variation in house price levels, the truncated cases came disproportionately 
from high-cost markets such as Boston, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York. 
Furthermore, these markets experienced steep declines in nominal house prices in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. Therefore, the exclusion of observations with top-coded values results in 
differential sample selection and potentially biased estimated equity effects. To overcome this 
problem, I obtained permission from the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, to use housing value and mortgage data from the NLSY79 master file at the Center for 
Human Resources Research (CHRR) at the Ohio State University. Specifically, CHRR released 
to me new house value and mortgage data in which the top-code thresholds were adjusted 
upward so that only approximately 2 percent of the observations in each of the 1985 to 1998 
survey years had top-coded house values and mortgage amounts. These new data were used in 
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the empirical analysis. All asset and debt values in the paper are in real 1993 dollars, deflated by 
the All-Items CPI. 
Assets and Debts 
For budgetary reasons, questions on assets and debts were not asked in the 1991 wave of 
the NLSY79 (Engelhardt 1998). However, questions about income from assets in 1991 were 
asked in the 1992 wave, and asset and debt questions were asked in the 1990 and 1992 waves. 
So, for 1991 the asset income was capitalized at the prevailing annual return. This, along with 
information from 1990 and 1992, was used to impute assets and debts for each household in 
1991. The empirical results were not sensitive to the exclusion of all 1991 observations.  
Dummy If Housing Expenditure-Constrained 
Let i  index households and t  index calendar years; then, following Poterba (1991), 
whether or not the household claims itemized deductions for mortgage interest and property 
taxes paid depends on the tax saving from itemizing, ξ , 
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where pτ  is the property tax rate, 0i   is the nominal mortgage interest rate in the year of 
purchase, LTV  is the loan-to-value rate, and S  is the standard deduction amount. *V  is an 
exogenous measure of house value, similar in spirit to simulated loan-to-value. It is the 
household’s house value if the home had appreciated at the average metropolitan rate, atI , 
defined in the text. θ  is the household’s federal marginal tax rate on the first dollar of itemized 
deduction. The variable sτ  is the household’s state marginal tax rate on the first dollar of 
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itemized deduction. If 0≥itξ , then the household will itemize and the marginal user cost of 
owner-occupied housing (as a fraction of the house price) is  
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where d  is the physical rate of decay, m  is maintenance expenditure, a  is a risk factor, and eπ  
is expected appreciation. If 0<itξ , then the household will not itemize and the marginal user 
cost is 
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Following Poterba (1984, 1991), the user cost is calibrated for each household under the 
following assumptions: 02.0=pτ , , 014.0=d , 05.0=a ; and i  is the rate on a 30-year fixed 
rate mortgage. The federal and state tax first-dollar marginal tax rates were calculated using the 
NBER TAXSIM calculator. The dummy if housing expenditure-constrained was constructed to 
take on a value of 1 if the flow cost of housing relative to income, 
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(where y  is household income) was greater than 0.33 and zero otherwise. A key assumption in 
calculating (A4) is what LTV to use in (A1) and (A3). Variants of this variable were constructed 
using an LTV of 0.80, 0.90, 0.95, as well as contemporaneous simulated LTV; the estimation 
results were remarkably robust across these alternative specifications. The results in Tables 
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4 through 7 in the paper used an LTV of 0.95, which is akin to assuming that the household 
would take out a mortgage on the next home with just 5 percent down. Such mortgages were 
prevalent by the end of the sample period. This assumption helps insure that the variable really 
picks up expenditure-constrained households, for these would be households who could not buy 
back their current residence and spend less than one-third of their income on housing. Variants of 
this variable were also constructed using flow-cost-of-housing-to-income ratios of 0.25, 0.28, 
0.30, and 0.40 to define the dummy. Again, the estimation results were quite robust to these 
alternatives.  
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Table A-1  
Sample Means (Standard Deviations) for the Explanatory Variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
           SubSample of Observations with 
 
 
Explanatory Variable 
 
Full 
Sample 
Intrametropolitan 
Own-to-Own 
Moves 
Intrametropolitan 
Own-to-Rent 
Moves 
 
Intermetropolitan 
Moves 
Dummy if LTV>0.80 
×LTV 
0.317 
(0.433) 
0.303 
(0.428) 
0.335 
(0.442) 
0.367 
(0.455) 
     
Dummy if Nominal Loss 
×Nominal Loss 
0.0052 
(0.022) 
0.0050 
(0.019) 
0.204 
(0.394) 
0.225 
(0.412) 
     
Dummy if Nominal Gain 
×Nominal Gain 
0.064 
(0.112) 
0.069 
(0.100) 
0.051 
(0.092) 
0.068 
(0.130) 
     
Dummy if Married 0.799 0.803 0.730 0.784 
     
Dummy if White  0.818 0.837 0.666 0.856 
     
Dummy if Age 30 to 34 0.485 0.518 0.466 0.496 
     
Dummy if Age 35 to 39 0.144 0.117 0.080 0.096 
     
Dummy if Some College 0.258 0.272 0.270 0.168 
     
Dummy if College 
Degree  
0.318 0.322 0.121 0.520 
     
Dummy if Children Age 
5 and Under 
0.432 0.477 0.454 0.400 
     
Dummy if Children Age 
6 to 10 
0.330 0.312 0.419 0.304 
     
Dummy if Children Age 
11 to 18 
0.185 0.178 0.230 0.144 
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Table A-1 (Continued) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
           Sub-Sample of Observations with 
 
 
Explanatory Variable 
 
Full 
Sample 
Intrametropolitan 
Own-to-Own 
Moves 
Intrametropolitan 
Own-to-Rent 
Moves 
 
Intermetropolitan 
Moves 
Dummy if Children over Age 18 0.021 0.015 
 
0.034 
 
0 
 
     
Dummy if Not Employed 0.172 0.179 0.183 0.240 
     
Dummy if Divorced 0.067 0.083 0.109 0.056 
     
Dummy if Housing Expenditure- 
Constrained 
0.195 0.183 0.264 0.208 
     
Real Income 62,173 
(98,336) 
66,017 
(104,773) 
57,746 
(112,193) 
91,347 
(180,154) 
     
Real Net Worth 67,736 
(74,364) 
70,503 
(81,032) 
42,387 
(48,715) 
75,666 
(76,293) 
     
County Unemployment Rate 6.23 
(2.46) 
6.08 
(2.33) 
6.35 
(2.29) 
6.37 
(2.65) 
     
Dummy if LTV>0.90 ×LTV 0.161 
(0.360) 
0.146 
(0.347) 
0.204 
(0.394) 
0.225 
(0.412) 
     
Number of Observations 6,461 596 174 125 
     
Note: Sample means of the explanatory variables, with standard deviations for all continuous 
variables shown in parentheses. Income and net worth are in thousands of 1993 dollars. The county 
unemployment rate is measured in percentage points. The sample mean LTV for those in the 
constrained group was 0.905. The sample mean nominal loss for those who experienced nominal 
losses was 0.054, or a 5.4 percent loss. The sample mean nominal gain for those who experienced 
nominal gains was 0.135, or a 13.5 percent gain.  
Source: Author’s calculations.  
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1.  Green and Hendershott (2001) have analyzed this in the United States as well. Some 
aspects of the link between housing and mobility have been explored by Bover, 
Muellbauer, and Murphy (1989), Hughes and McCormick (1981, 1985, 1987), Henley 
(1998a,b), Boheim and Taylor (2000), and Gardner, Pierre, and Oswald (2000) in the 
United Kingdon and Van Der Berg (1992) in the Netherlands. 
 
2.  The down payment requirement for conventional mortgages ranges from 10 to 20 
percent. Changes in secondary mortgage market underwriting guidelines have made 5 
percent down mortgages more prevalent. 
 
3.  Another possible source of down payment funds is transfers from family or friends. 
Engelhardt and Mayer (1998) found that about 25 percent of first-time buyers receive 
such transfers, but among repeat buyers they were rare (4 percent). 
 
4.  This example abstracts from other costs that may further deter households. These include 
private mortgage insurance (discussed later in the text), closing costs, broker costs, and 
moving costs. Moving costs can be at least $750 to $4500, depending on the area, 
distance, and volume. For a $155,000 mortgage in the greater New York metropolitan 
area, Caplin, Freeman, and Tracy (1997) estimated the closing costs to be between 
$5,100 and $8,400, or 3.3 and 5.4 percent of the loan, respectively. In general, brokers 
are paid 6 percent of the sale price of the home. 
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5.  It is important to note that this leverage effect is independent of a wealth effect from the 
capital gain (or loss). To illustrate this, consider a model with no mortgages—all homes 
must be purchased in cash. A household owning a $100,000 home who experienced 10 
percent appreciation could afford to purchase just a $110,000 home. The fact that 
households can borrow to finance the purchase of a home means that a dollar of capital 
gain can buy more than a dollar of housing. 
 
6.  Stein (1995) referred to this as “packing.”  Mayer (1993) has provided striking evidence 
on this. He examined the level of housing leverage in Massachusetts (predominantly the 
greater Boston metropolitan area) during the boom and bust of the 1980s and 1990s. He 
found that of the 580,000 households who purchased single family homes between 1982 
and 1992, more than 150,000 had less than 5 percent equity in 1992, and the majority of 
these had no equity. Even lower equity levels were found in the condominium market. 
These findings suggest the great potential for collateral constraints. Lamont and Stein 
(1999) observed substantial variation in packing across metropolitan areas using data 
from the American Housing Surveys. 
 
7.  In this light, housing equity plays a role similar to collateral for firms. There, temporary 
economic shocks that depress the value of assets used for productive purposes and 
collateral can reduce the net worth of firms, reduce the asset demand for constrained 
firms, and result in lower asset prices. This further reduces net worth and feeds back into 
prices. This link between asset prices and collateral has been examined recently by 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992), among others.  
 
8.  Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) provide a summary of the empirical evidence consistent with 
collateral constraints for firms. Henley (1998a) examined the effect of negative housing 
equity on the mobility of British households in the early 1990’s. He used a sample of 
3,530 households from the 1991 to 1994 waves of the British Household Panel Survey 
and estimated a semiparametric duration model of mobility with competing risks. The 
three risks modeled were a move to an owner-occupied home, a move to a public-sector 
rental, and a move to a private-sector rental. He found significant lock-in from fallen 
prices. His estimates suggested that the mobility of negative equity households would 
have been 50 percent higher if they had had a positive equity position. 
9. Three related studies have found evidence that low equity constrains mortgage 
refinancing in the United States. Caplin, Freeman, and Tracy (1997) used a national 
sample of 35,865 Chemical Bank mortgages. They examined prepayments and found that 
constrained households were significantly less likely to refinance. Constrained 
households were defined as those with less then 20 percent equity in states with weak 
housing markets (Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Rhode Island). 
Peristiani et al.(1996) examined mortgage refinancing with a sample of mortgages from 
the Mortgage Research Group for a number of counties in five states. The counties 
examined were Los Angeles, Riverside, and Ventura Counties, CA; Citrus, Clay, 
Escambia, Hernando, Manatee, and Marion Counties, FL; Cook County, IL; Bergen, 
Essex, and Monmouth, NJ; and, Orange County, NY. They found that low equity and 
poor credit history significantly decreased refinancing. Finally, Archer, Ling, and McGill 
(1996) used a panel of 5,042 households from the 1985 and 1987 American Housing 
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Surveys. They estimated that constrained households (i.e., less than 10 percent equity) 
were significantly less likely to refinance.
 
10.  For example, the LINK data used by Genesove and Mayer (1997) had very detailed 
information on the listing behavior of sellers in the downtown Boston condominium 
market, which were necessary for the very clean empirical tests for equity constraints on 
seller behavior. But these data do not provide information on motivations for sale 
(Glower, Haurin, and Hendershott (1998)). Chan (2001) used Chemical Bank mortgage 
records for the New York metropolitan area, but these data only provided detailed 
financial and demographic data at the time of underwriting. In both studies, nothing is 
known about what precipitated the move or the type of move (intra- vs. intermetropolitan 
or own-to-own vs. own-to-rent).  
 
11.  It is important to emphasize that equity effects require declining nominal prices. Real 
prices can fall even when nominal prices are flat or rising, as long as inflation exceeds 
nominal appreciation. In addition, loss aversion is with respect to nominal, not real, 
losses. Genesove and Mayer (2001) provide evidence that it is nominal losses that matter. 
Seller behavior is only weakly affected by real losses. In the analysis below, there was no 
evidence that real losses mattered. 
 
12.  This issue is not addressed in the static model of Stein (1995) but is in the dynamic model 
of Ortalo-Magne and Rady (1998). Engelhardt (1996a) examined the effect of housing 
gains and losses on homeowner saving behavior. 
 
13.  Furthermore, surveys of homeowners in boom and bust housing markets by Case and 
Shiller (1988) have provided provocative evidence that homeowners are not forward-
looking. Rather, they seem to base their expectations of future price movements on past 
price behavior, not fundamentals, so that it may take a number of years of declining 
prices until households expect prices to decline and adjust their behavior. Based on the 
declines in Column 4, even two years of prices falling at an annual rate of 2.5 percent 
(roughly the lower bound in Column 4) would have been enough to have constrained 
highly leveraged owners. 
 
14.  In the sample, many intermetropolitan own-to-rent movers bought a home a year after 
arrival in the new metropolitan area. This is consistent with renting as a short-term, 
owner-occupied housing search device. Because the subsample of the remaining (i.e., 
“permanent”) intermetropolitan own-to-rent movers was so small, reliable estimates for 
this transition could not be made. Consequently, all intermetropolitan movers were 
pooled into one category. 
 
15.  In fact, for an individual purchasing a home with 15 percent down, the shadow rate of 
return on the additional down payment of 5 percent would be equal to the mortgage 
interest rate plus an additional 12 percentage points for PMI. 
 
16.  It would be very interesting to examine stricter measures of constraints, such as an LTV 
of 0.95, or even negative equity (Henley 1998a). However, the cell sizes become too 
small for reliable estimation and inference for these categories in this sample. 
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17.  In principle, the effect of the nominal loss on low-equity households may be nonlinear if 
the loss is so large that the mortgage default option is in the money. This is not addressed 
in this paper because the cell sizes became small as loan-to-value rose above one, which 
resulted in unreliable estimation and inference in this sample. Moreover, there is an 
extensive literature on the effect of house price fluctuations on mortgage default, most of 
which uses data that are superior for default models than these data. Mattey and Wallace 
(1998, 1999) review much of this literature and discuss the role of house price declines 
on mortgage defaults. 
 
18.  Note that this is consistent with Genesove and Mayer (2001). If households are loss 
averse, they will attempt to attenuate losses by setting a higher list price and accept 
longer time on the market. But longer time on the market (including withdrawal of the 
property) implies a longer duration and a lower hazard of moving.  
 
19.  Remember that, in this context, symmetric treatment of gains and losses would be that 
households hold gains and shed losses, ceteris paribus. 
 
20.  The NLSY79 is a longitudinal survey that began in 1979 with 12,686 individuals between 
the ages of 14 and 21. By the 1996 interview data, the last year in my sample, these 
individuals were between the ages of 31 and 39. Hence, there are no individuals older 
than 39 in the sample, and that is why the age variables only go to 39 years. In addition, 
because the NLSY79 focused on a birth cohort, after conditioning on other covariates, 
there is little true age variation in the sample. 
 
21.  One interpretation is that these factors may proxy for financial security; and financially 
secure households may be better able to obtain a good housing match and, therefore, 
move less often. 
 
22.  Different cutoffs defining constrained households were used and did not change the 
empirical findings. Overall, the results were quite robust to changes in the definition of 
this variable. 
 
23.  Alternate measures of wealth were used to check the robustness of the estimates for this 
specification. These measures included non-housing wealth, financial wealth, financial 
assets, and highly liquid assets. These alternative specifications produced economically 
very similar and statistically significant lock-in effects to those shown in Column 3 of 
Table 4. In addition, specifications were estimated that used the measure of “extended 
LTV” from Chan (2001), which is defined as loan balance less other assets, divided by 
house value. The results were similar in economic magnitude and statistical significance 
to those shown here. Furthermore, a number of alternative measures of the housing 
expenditure constraint were specified. These are described in detail in the appendix. 
Again, all of these specifications produced estimates quantitatively similar to those 
presented here. These specifications are available upon request. Overall, these findings 
were very robust to alternative specifications. Finally, quadratic terms in the loss and gain 
variables were added to the model, but the null hypothesis of linearity in each could not 
be rejected at conventional significance levels. 
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24.  The p-values for the test of the null hypothesis of no equity constraints in Table 5 are 
larger than those in Table 4 because the definition of constrained at an LTV of 0.90 
generates smaller cell sizes for the constrained group, which reduces the precision in 
estimation and raises the standard errors.  
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Table 1.  Percent of Wealth in Housing at First Home Purchase 
 
Wealth (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Measure Mean Median 25th percentile 75th percentile 
Liquid Assets 80.5 90.6 68.9 99.0 
     
Liquid Assets 83.6 94.4 72.7 100.0 
Less Debts     
Note: Total liquid assets is the amount of the down payment plus the value of financial assets in the form of 
savings accounts, money market deposit accounts, certificates of deposit, interest-earning checking accounts, 
United States saving bonds, individual retirement accounts (IRAs), 401(k)-type pension arrangements, Keogh 
plans, mortgages held by the household, non-interest earning checking accounts, money market funds, United 
States government securities, municipal and corporate bonds, stocks and mutual fund shares, money owed by 
others to the household, and other interest-earning-assets. Debts are the sum of farm, business, and 
non-owner-occupied real estate debt and non-vehicle-related debt. 
Source: Author’s calculations from the sample of all first-time homebuyers in the 1985-90 waves of the 
NLSY79 
 
 39
 
Table 2.  Episodes of Falling Nominal House Prices for Selected Metropolitan Areas 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Metropolitan Area 
Market 
Peak 
(Yr:Qtr) 
Market 
Trough 
(Yr:Qtr) 
Peak-to-Trough 
Total Decline 
(percent) 
Peak-to-Trough 
Annual Average 
Decline (percent) 
Houston, TX 83:2 87:4 27.2 5.5 
Dallas, TX 86:2 89:1 14.4 5.0 
Austin, TX 86:2 88:4 26.9 10.0 
San Antonio, TX 86:1 90:2 20.0 4.4 
Oklahoma City, OK 86:2 88:3 22.7 9.5 
Tulsa, OK 83:3 89:1 15.3 2.6 
New Orleans, LA 86:2 88:4 11.9 4.6 
Baton Rouge, LA 86:1 89:1 14.1 4.5 
Denver, CO 86:2 89:1 6.8 2.4 
     
Boston, MA 88:4 92:2 9.7 2.7 
Portsmouth, NH 89:1 92:3 15.3 4.2 
Providence, RI 89:4 94:4 11.8 2.3 
Hartford, CT 88:3 95:1 19.7 2.8 
New Haven, CT 88:2 95:1 20.8 2.8 
     
New York, NY 89:1 91:3 6.4 2.5 
Nassau-Suffolk, NY 88:3 91:2 9.0 3.2 
Middlesex-Somerset, NJ 88:2 91:3 10.5 3.1 
Bergen-Passaic, NJ 88:2 91:3 10.0 3.0 
     
Los Angeles, CA 90:1 95:1 21.5 4.0 
Orange County, CA 90:1 95:1 17.9 3.4 
Riverside, CA 91:1 95:1 19.1 4.5 
Santa Barbara, CA 90:3 95:1 12.4 2.6 
San Diego, CA 90:3 95:1 10.2 2.2 
San Francisco, CA 90:1 94:4 11.0 2.2 
San Jose, CA 89:4 94:3 12.2 2.4 
Source: Author’s calculations using Freddie Mac/Fannie Mae weighted-repeat-sales quarterly house price 
indices for each of the metropolitan areas shown. 
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Table 3.  The Effect of Falling Nominal House Prices on the 
           Distribution of Housing Equity and Net Worth 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Percent in Cell 
 All Observations Observations in Stable or 
Rising Markets 
Observations in Falling 
Markets 
 
Category 
Purchase 
Year 
Current 
Year 
Purchase 
Year 
Current 
Year 
Purchase 
Year 
Current 
Year 
A. Housing Equity as a Percent Age of Home Value 
       
20 Percent or More 55.2 63.1 54.8 64.3 59.0 52.1 
10-19 Percent 20.5 23.5 21.2 17.7 14.0 15.5 
Less Than 10 Percent 24.3 13.4 24.0 18.0 27.0 32.4 
       
B. Net Worth as a Percent Age of Home Value 
       
20 Percent or More 81.4 84.8 81.8 85.6 77.1 77.8 
10-19 Percent 10.7 8.0 10.7 7.7 10.9 10.9 
Less Than 10 Percent 7.9 7.2 7.5 6.7 12.0 11.3 
 Source: Author’s calculations from the sample of 6,461 household-year observations described in the text. 
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Table 4.    Semiparametric Proportional Hazard Model Estimates of  
Intrametropolitan Own-to-Own Mobility, 
 with Loan-to-Value Threshold at 80 Percent 
 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dummy if LTV>0.80 ×LTV -0.166 
(0.100) 
(0.049) 
-0.150 
(0.101) 
(0.068) 
-0.132 
(0.106) 
(0.105) 
-0.123 
(0.106) 
(0.123) 
     
Dummy if Nominal Loss 
×Nominal Loss 
-5.010 
(2.452) 
(0.0001) 
-7.736 
(2.457) 
(0.001) 
-7.544 
(2.457) 
(0.001) 
-5.855 
(2.472) 
(0.009) 
     
Dummy if Nominal Gain 
×Nominal Gain 
-9.872 
(0.529) 
(0.0001) 
-3.693 
(0.570) 
(0.0001) 
-3.675 
(0.572) 
(0.0001) 
-3.455 
(0.575) 
(0.0001) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 1 -3.730 
(0.212) 
-3.200 
(0.263) 
-3.180 
(0.266) 
-3.047 
(0.278) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 2 -3.321 
(0.215) 
-2.841 
(0.260) 
-2.833 
(0.263) 
-2.727 
(0.274) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 3 -2.922 
(0.212) 
-2.494 
(0.255) 
-2.483 
(0.258) 
-2.367 
(0.269) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 4 -2.968 
(0.235) 
-2.516 
(0.275) 
-2.510 
(0.277) 
-2.409 
(0.287) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 5 -2.656 
(0.217) 
-2.259 
(0.255) 
-2.250 
(0.256) 
-2.173 
(0.265) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 6 -2.715 
(0.313) 
-2.339 
(0.340) 
-2.340 
(0.341) 
-2.260 
(0.348) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 7 -3.886 
(0.521) 
-3.503 
(0.537) 
-3.498 
(0.537) 
-3.399 
(0.544) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 8 -2.553 
(0.524) 
-2.187 
(0.542) 
-2.191 
(0.542) 
-2.077 
(0.545) 
     
Dummy if Married --- -0.180 
(0.124) 
-0.199 
(0.127) 
-0.170 
(0.128) 
Dummy if White --- -0.086 
(0.105) 
-0.088 
(0.106) 
-0.072 
(0.107) 
     
Dummy if Age 30 to 34 --- -0.390 
(0.114) 
-0.396 
(0.114) 
-0.376 
(0.115) 
     
Dummy if Age 35 to 39 --- -0.742 
(0.174) 
-0.757 
(0.175) 
-0.714 
(0.176) 
     
Dummy if Some College --- -0.054 
(0.103) 
-0.055 
(0.103) 
-0.035 
(0.103) 
     
Dummy if College Degree --- -0.137 
(0.102) 
-0.147 
(0.103) 
-0.137 
(0.103) 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dummy if Children Age 6 to 10 --- -0.169 
(0.096) 
-0.160 
(0.096) 
-0.134 
(0.096) 
 
Dummy if Children Age 11 to 18 --- -0.077 
(0.121) 
-0.072 
(0.121) 
-0.055 
(0.121) 
     
Dummy if Children Over Age 18 --- -0.368 
(0.345) 
-0.351 
(0.343) 
-0.264 
(0.342) 
     
Dummy if Not Employed --- 0.049 
(0.109) 
0.055 
(0.109) 
0.065 
(0.109) 
     
Dummy if Divorced --- 0.125 
(0.183) 
0.144 
(0.183) 
0.166 
(0.184) 
     
Dummy if Housing Expenditure-
Constrained 
--- --- -0.153 
(0.114) 
-0.133 
(0.113) 
     
Real Income --- --- -0.00037 
(0.00040) 
-0.00034 
(0.00040) 
     
Real Net Worth --- --- -0.00059 
(0.00060) 
0.00060 
(0.00060) 
     
County Unemployment Rate --- --- --- -0.057 
(0.021) 
     
Log Likelihood -1748.9 -1724.8 -1742.3 -1719.1 
     
Estimated Percentage Shift in the 
Baseline Hazard due to Equity 
Constraint 
-13.9 -12.7 -12.0 -10.5 
     
Estimated Percentage Shift in the 
Baseline Hazard due to Nominal 
Loss 
-41.6 -34.2 -33.5 -27.1 
     
Estimated Percentage Shift in the 
Baseline Hazard due to Nominal 
Gain 
-49.6 -39.2 -39.0 -37.2 
     
p-Value for Test of Symmetry of 
Gains and Losses ( γδ −= ) 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.006 
Note: Prentice-Gloeckler-Meyer semiparametric hazard model estimates calculated on 6,461 
household-year observations that comprise 3,112 residence spells, and 596 intrametropolitan 
own-to-own moves. The hazard is the probability of moving at time t conditional on not 
having moved before then. Standard errors are in parentheses. The p-values for the test of the 
null hypotheses of no equity constraint, no effect of nominal loss on mobility, and no effect of 
nominal gain on mobility (versus the alternatives outlined in the text) are shown in square 
brackets for the first three explanatory variables in the table, respectively. Income and net 
worth are in thousands of 1993 dollars. The county unemployment rate is measured in 
percentage points. The estimated percentage shift in the baseline hazard due to the equity 
constraint is calculated based on each specification’s parameter estimate with respect to the 
interaction between the dummy if LTV>0.80 and the LTV (i.e., were in the constrained group), 
evaluated at the sample mean LTV for those in the constrained group of 0.905. The estimated 
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percentage shift in the baseline hazard due to the nominal loss is calculated based on each 
specification’s parameter estimate with respect to the interaction between the dummy if 
nominal loss and the nominal loss, (the second explanatory variable in the table) evaluated at 
the sample mean nominal loss for those who experienced nominal losses of 0.054, or 5.4 
percent loss. The estimated percentage shift in the baseline hazard due to the nominal gain is 
calculated based on each specification’s parameter estimate with respect to the interaction 
between the dummy if nominal gain and the nominal gain, (the third explanatory variable in 
the table) evaluated at the sample mean nominal gain for those who experienced nominal 
gains of 0.135, or 13.5 percent gain. All specifications estimated with a full set of calendar 
year dummies. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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Table 5.  Semiparametric Proportional Hazard Model Estimates of 
Intrametropolitan Own-to-Own Mobility, with 
Loan-to-ValueThreshold at 90 Percent 
 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dummy if LTV>0.90 
×LTV 
-0.203 
(0.124) 
(0.051) 
-0.165 
(0.125) 
(0.093) 
-0.139 
(0.127) 
(0.138) 
-0.130 
(0.127) 
(0.154) 
     
Dummy if Nominal Loss 
×Nominal Loss 
-9.687 
(2.458) 
(0.0001) 
-7.616 
(2.463) 
(0.001) 
-7.477 
(2.463) 
(0.001) 
-5.785 
(2.478) 
(0.010) 
     
Dummy if Nominal Gain 
×Nominal Gain 
-4.993 
(0.528) 
(0.0001) 
-3.665 
(0.569) 
(0.0001) 
-3.654 
(0.571) 
(0.0001) 
-3.433 
(0.573) 
(0.0001) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 1 -3.748 
(0.210) 
-3.218 
(0.261) 
-3.201 
(0.264) 
-3.065 
(0.276) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 2 -3.345 
(0.214) 
-2.864 
(0.259) 
-2.856 
(0.262) 
-2.749 
(0.272) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 3 -2.951 
(0.211) 
-2.521 
(0.254) 
-2.510 
(0.256) 
-2.391 
(0.267) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 4 -2.986 
(0.234) 
-2.534 
(0.275) 
-2.528 
(0.276) 
-2.426 
(0.286) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 5 -2.675 
(0.217) 
-2.275 
(0.255) 
-2.267 
(0.256) 
-2.188 
(0.265) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 6 -2.736 
(0.313) 
-2.357 
(0.340) 
-2.358 
(0.341) 
-2.277 
(0.348) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 7 -3.907 
(0.521) 
-3.520 
(0.537) 
-3.515 
(0.538) 
-3.415 
(0.544) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 8 -2.570 
(0.524) 
-2.199 
(0.542) 
-2.202 
(0.542) 
-2.088 
(0.545) 
     
Dummy if Married --- -0.189 
(0.124) 
-0.207 
(0.126) 
-0.177 
(0.128) 
Dummy if White --- -0.081 
(0.105) 
-0.086 
(0.106) 
-0.070 
(0.107) 
     
Dummy if Age 30 to 34 --- -0.387 
(0.114) 
-0.395 
(0.114) 
-0.375 
(0.115) 
     
Dummy if Age 35 to 39 --- -0.737 
(0.174) 
-0.754 
(0.175) 
-0.710 
(0.176) 
     
Dummy if Some College --- -0.057 
(0.103) 
-0.058 
(0.103) 
-0.037 
(0.103) 
     
Dummy if College Degree --- -0.136 
(0.102) 
-0.148 
(0.103) 
-0.137 
(0.103) 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Dummy if Children Age 6 
to 10 
--- -0.167 
(0.096) 
-0.159 
(0.096) 
-0.132 
(0.096) 
     
Dummy if Children Age 
11 to 18 
--- -0.075 
(0.121) 
-0.070 
(0.121) 
-0.053 
(0.121) 
     
Dummy if Children Over 
Age 18 
--- -0.371 
(0.345) 
-0.355 
(0.344) 
-0.267 
(0.342) 
     
Dummy if Not Employed --- 0.054 
(0.109) 
0.058 
(0.109) 
0.067 
(0.109) 
     
Dummy if Divorced --- 0.114 
(0.182) 
0.134 
(0.183) 
0.157 
(0.184) 
     
Dummy if Housing 
Expenditure-Constrained 
--- --- -0.147 
(0.114) 
-0.128 
(0.114) 
     
Real Income --- --- -0.00037 
(0.00040) 
-0.00034 
(0.00040) 
     
Real Net Worth --- --- -0.00068 
(0.00059) 
0.00068 
(0.00058) 
County Unemployment 
Rate 
--- --- --- -0.057 
(0.020) 
     
Log Likelihood -1748.9 -1725.0 -1723.5 -1719.3 
     
Estimated Percentage 
Shift in the Baseline 
Hazard due to Equity 
Constraint 
-17.8 -14.8 -12.6 -11.7 
     
Estimated Percentage 
Shift in the Baseline 
Hazard due to Nominal 
Loss 
-40.7 -33.7 -33.2 -26.8 
     
Estimated Percentage 
Shift in the Baseline 
Hazard due to Nominal 
Gain 
-49.0 -39.0 -38.9 -37.1 
     
p-Value for Test of 
Symmetry of Gains and 
Losses ( γδ −= ) 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.007 
Note: Prentice-Gloeckler-Meyer semiparametric hazard model estimates calculated on 
6,461 household-year observations that comprise 3,112 residence spells, and 596 
intrametropolitan own-to-own moves. The hazard is the probability of moving at time 
t conditional on not having moved before then. Standard errors are in parentheses. The 
p-values for the test of the null hypotheses of no equity constraint, no effect of 
nominal loss on mobility, and no effect of nominal gain on mobility (versus the 
alternatives outlined in the text) are shown in square brackets for the first three 
explanatory variables in the table, respectively. Income and net worth are in thousands 
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of 1993 dollars. The county unemployment rate is measured in percentage points. The 
estimated percentage shift in the baseline hazard due to the equity constraint is 
calculated based on each specification’s parameter estimate with respect to the 
interaction between the dummy if LTV>0.90 and the LTV (i.e., were in the constrained 
group), evaluated at the sample mean LTV for those in the constrained group of 0.965. 
The estimated percentage shift in the baseline hazard due to the nominal loss is 
calculated based on each specification’s parameter estimate with respect to the 
interaction between the dummy if nominal loss and the nominal loss, (the second 
explanatory variable in the table) evaluated at the sample mean nominal loss for those 
who experienced nominal losses of 0.054, or 5.4 percent loss. The estimated 
percentage shift in the baseline hazard due to the nominal gain is calculated based on 
each specification’s parameter estimate with respect to the interaction between the 
dummy if nominal gain and the nominal gain, (the third explanatory variable in the 
table) evaluated at the sample mean nominal gain for those who experienced nominal 
gains of 0.135, or 13.5 percent gain. All specifications estimated with a full set of 
calendar year dummies. 
Source: Author’s caluculations. 
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Table 6.  Semiparametric Proportional Hazard Model Estimates of 
Intrametropolitan Own-to-Rent Mobility, with   
Loan-to-Value Threshold at 80 Percent 
 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dummy if LTV>0.80 
×LTV 
-0.112 
(0.179) 
(0.767) 
-0.050 
(0.181) 
(0.892) 
-0.339 
(0.191) 
(0.539) 
-0.329 
(0.191) 
(0.543) 
     
Dummy if Nominal Loss 
×Nominal Loss 
-9.765 
(4.234) 
(0.011) 
-3.709 
(4.111) 
(0.183) 
-3.149 
(4.125) 
(0.222) 
-1.234 
(4.176) 
(0.384) 
     
Dummy if Nominal Gain 
×Nominal Gain 
-8.352 
(1.069) 
(0.0001) 
-5.318 
(1.190) 
(0.0001) 
-5.179 
(1.204) 
(0.0001) 
-4.814 
(1.229) 
(0.0001) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 1 -5.103 
(0.394) 
-3.772 
(0.519) 
-3.544 
(0.530) 
-3.414 
(0.557) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 2 -4.936 
(0.406) 
-3.751 
(0.516) 
-3.528 
(0.525) 
-3.423 
(0.549) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 3 -4.599 
(0.415) 
-3.439 
(0.516) 
-3.247 
(0.524) 
-3.128 
(0.547) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 4 -4.204 
(0.422) 
-3.068 
(0.521) 
-2.891 
(0.529) 
-2.798 
(0.550) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 5 -4.490 
(0.461) 
-3.503 
(0.545) 
-3.349 
(0.522) 
-3.286 
(0.570) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 6 -3.343 
(0.492) 
-2.346 
(0.569) 
-2.177 
(0.574) 
-2.100 
(0.592) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 7 -3.422 
(0.560) 
-2.511 
(0.635) 
-2.366 
(0.639) 
-2.287 
(0.656) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 8 -2.781 
(0.770) 
-1.826 
(0.811) 
-1.740 
(0.823) 
-1.623 
(0.836) 
     
Dummy if Married --- -0.629 
(0.210) 
-0.558 
(0.214) 
-0.527 
(0.217) 
     
Dummy if White --- -0.782 
(0.161) 
-0.718 
(0.161) 
-0.699 
(0.163) 
     
Dummy if Age 30 to 34 --- -0.461 
(0.214) 
-0.389 
(0.217) 
-0.362 
(0.218) 
     
Dummy if Age 35 to 39 --- -1.115 
(0.364) 
-1.003 
(0.355) 
-0.951 
(0.358) 
     
Dummy if Some College --- -0.404 
(0.178) 
-0.351 
(0.179) 
-0.343 
(0.179) 
     
Dummy if College Degree --- -1.290 
(0.247) 
-1.213 
(0.248) 
-1.218 
(0.248) 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dummy if Children Age 6 
to 10 
--- -0.185 
(0.163) 
-0.154 
(0.164) 
-0.183 
(0.165) 
     
Dummy if Children Age 
11 to 18 
--- -0.107 
(0.202) 
-0.068 
(0.203) 
-0.073 
(0.203) 
     
Dummy if Children Over 
Age 18 
--- -0.529 
(0.436) 
-0.507 
(0.441) 
-0.646 
(0.440) 
     
Dummy if Not Employed --- 0.064 
(0.199) 
0.057 
(0.200) 
0.082 
(0.201) 
     
Dummy if Divorced --- -0.075 
(0.296) 
-0.155 
(0.298) 
-0.145 
(0.300) 
     
Dummy if Housing 
Expenditure-Constrained 
--- --- 0.343 
(0.184) 
0.377 
(0.185) 
     
Real Income --- --- -0.0012 
(0.00069) 
-0.0012 
(0.00069) 
     
Real Net Worth --- --- -0.0076 
(0.0018) 
-0.0076 
(0.0018) 
     
County Unemployment 
Rate 
--- --- --- -0.068 
(0.036) 
     
Log Likelihood -789.4 -735.7 -725.4 -723.5 
     
Estimated Percentage Shift 
in the Baseline Hazard due 
to Equity Constraint 
-9.6 -4.4 -26.4 -25.7 
     
Estimated Percentage Shift 
in the Baseline Hazard due 
to Nominal Loss 
-41.0 -18.1 -15.6 -6.4 
     
Estimated Percentage Shift 
in the Baseline Hazard due 
to Nominal Gain 
-67.5 -51.1 -50.3 -15.3 
     
p-Value for Test of 
Symmetry of Gains and 
Losses ( γδ −= ) 
0.0001 0.053 0.076 0.207 
Note: Prentice-Gloeckler-Meyer semiparametric hazard model estimates calculated 
on 6,461 household-year observations that comprise 3,112 residence spells, and 174 
intrametropolitan own-to-rent moves. The hazard is the probability of moving at 
time t conditional on not having moved before then. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. The p-values for the test of the null hypotheses of no equity constraint, 
no effect of nominal loss on mobility, and no effect of nominal gain on mobility 
(versus the alternatives outlined in the text) are shown in square brackets for the 
first three explanatory variables in the table, respectively. Income and net worth are 
in thousands of 1993 dollars. The county unemployment rate is measured in 
percentage points. The estimated percentage shift in the baseline hazard due to the 
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equity constraint is calculated based on each specification’s parameter estimate with 
respect to the interaction between the dummy if LTV>0.80 and the LTV (i.e., were 
in the constrained group), evaluated at the sample mean LTV for those in the 
constrained group of 0.905. The estimated percentage shift in the baseline hazard 
due to the nominal loss is calculated based on each specification’s parameter 
estimate with respect to the interaction between the dummy if nominal loss and the 
nominal loss, (the second explanatory variable in the table) evaluated at the sample 
mean nominal loss for those who experienced nominal losses of 0.054, or 5.4 
percent loss. The estimated percentage shift in the baseline hazard due to the 
nominal gain is calculated based on each specification’s parameter estimate with 
respect to the interaction between the dummy if nominal gain and the nominal gain, 
(the third explanatory variable in the table) evaluated at the sample mean nominal 
gain for those who experienced nominal gains of 0.135, or 13.5 percent gain. All 
specifications estimated with a full set of calendar year dummies. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 7.  Semiparametric Proportional Hazard Model Estimates 
of Intermetropolitan Mobility, with 
Loan-to-Value Threshold at 80 Percent 
 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dummy if LTV>0.80 
×LTV 
0.113 
(0.209) 
(0.588) 
0.131 
(0.212) 
(0.538) 
0.152 
(0.221) 
(0.492) 
0.167 
(0.222) 
(0.451) 
     
Dummy if Nominal Loss 
×Nominal Loss 
-6.878 
(4.491) 
(0.062) 
-0.273 
(4.200) 
(0.474) 
-0.267 
(4.231) 
(0.475) 
2.208 
(4.236) 
(0.602) 
     
Dummy if Nominal Gain 
×Nominal Gain 
-6.768 
(1.012) 
(0.0001) 
-3.753 
(1.176) 
(0.001) 
-3.682 
(1.168) 
(0.001) 
-3.200 
(1.187) 
(0.007) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 1 -5.275 
(0.407) 
-4.410 
(0.498) 
-4.394 
(0.501) 
-4.145 
(0.528) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 2 -4.573 
(0.412) 
-3.868 
(0.489) 
-3.839 
(0.491) 
-3.624 
(0.513) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 3 -4.261 
(0.411) 
-3.619 
(0.481) 
-3.600 
(0.482) 
-3.387 
(0.504) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 4 -4.202 
(0.428) 
-3.565 
(0.499) 
-3.553 
(0.499) 
-3.375 
(0.516) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 5 -4.563 
(0.505) 
-3.994 
(0.554) 
-3.993 
(0.554) 
-3.847 
(0.567) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 6 -4.478 
(0.784) 
-3.927 
(0.815) 
-3.909 
(0.815) 
-3.762 
(0.823) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 7 -4.076 
(0.745) 
-3.547 
(0.775) 
-3.529 
(0.775) 
-3.338 
(0.785) 
     
Baseline Dummy: Year 8 -19.679 
(2109) 
-20.220 
(3509) 
-20.205 
(3509) 
-20.079 
(3503) 
     
Dummy if Married --- -0.463 
 (0.231) 
-0.515 
(0.235) 
-0.447 
(0.241) 
     
Dummy if White --- -0.184 
 (0.218) 
-0.213 
(0.221) 
-0.172 
(0.225) 
     
Dummy if Age 30 to 34 --- -0.451 
 (0.234) 
-0.478 
(0.236) 
-0.434 
(0.238) 
     
Dummy if Age 35 to 39 --- -1.104 
 (0.395) 
-1.137 
(0.396) 
-1.043 
(0.400) 
     
Dummy if Some College --- -0.364 
 (0.263) 
-0.386 
(0.264) 
-0.338 
(0.266) 
     
Dummy if College 
Degree 
--- 0.569 
(0.204) 
0.527 
(0.207) 
0.543 
(0.208) 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dummy if Children Age 5 
and Under 
--- -0.152 
(0.198) 
-0.150 
(0.198) 
-0.138 
(0.199) 
     
Dummy if Children Age 6 
to 10 
--- 0.032 
(0.217) 
0.039 
(0.217) 
0.088 
(0.218) 
     
Dummy if Children Age 
11 to 18 
--- -0.098 
(0.282) 
-0.098 
(0.283) 
-0.064 
(0.283) 
     
Dummy if Children Over 
Age 18 
--- -17.319 
(2189) 
-17.285 
(2190) 
-17.077 
(2208) 
     
Dummy if Not Employed --- 0.417 
(0.213) 
0.413 
(0.214) 
0.425 
(0.215) 
     
Dummy if Divorced --- -0.497 
(0.432) 
-0.494 
(0.433) 
-0.430 
(0.435) 
     
Dummy if Housing 
Expenditure-Constrained 
--- --- -0.041 
(0.235) 
-0.005 
(0.237) 
     
Real Income --- --- -0.00086 
 (0.00055) 
0.00088 
(0.00054) 
     
Real Net Worth --- --- -0.00055 
(0.0012) 
0.00057 
(0.0012) 
County Unemployment 
Rate 
--- --- --- -0.094 
 (0.044) 
     
Log Likelihood -600.6 -575.5 -574.1 -571.5 
     
Estimated Percentage 
Shift in the Baseline 
Hazard due to Equity 
Constraint 
10.8 12.6 -12.9 16.3 
     
Estimated Percentage 
Shift in the Baseline 
Hazard due to Nominal 
Loss 
-31.0 -1.5 -1.4 12.7 
     
Estimated Percentage 
Shift in the Baseline 
Hazard due to Nominal 
Gain 
-59.8 -39.7 -39.2 -35.0 
     
p-Value for Test of 
Symmetry of Gains and 
Losses ( γδ −= ) 
0.005 0.394 0.405 0.836 
Note: Prentice-Gloeckler-Meyer semiparametric hazard model estimates calculated 
on 6,461 household-year observations that comprise 3,112 residence spells, and 125 
intermetropolitan moves. The hazard is the probability of moving at time t 
conditional on not having moved before then. Standard errors are in parentheses. The 
p-values for the test of the null hypotheses of no equity constraint, no effect of 
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nominal loss on mobility, and no effect of nominal gain on mobility (versus the 
alternatives outlined in the text) are shown in square brackets for the first three 
explanatory variables in the table, respectively. Income and net worth are in 
thousands of 1993 dollars. The county unemployment rate is measured in percentage 
points. The estimated percentage shift in the baseline hazard due to the equity 
constraint is calculated based on each specification’s parameter estimate with respect 
to the interaction between the dummy if LTV>0.80 and the LTV (i.e., were in the 
constrained group), evaluated at the sample mean LTV for those in the constrained 
group of 0.905. The estimated percentage shift in the baseline hazard due to the 
nominal loss is calculated based on each specification’s parameter estimate with 
respect to the interaction between the dummy if nominal loss and the nominal loss, 
(the second explanatory variable in the table) evaluated at the sample mean nominal 
loss for those who experienced nominal losses of 0.054, or 5.4 percent loss. The 
estimated percentage shift in the baseline hazard due to the nominal gain is 
calculated based on each specification’s parameter estimate with respect to the 
interaction between the dummy if nominal gain and the nominal gain, (the third 
explanatory variable in the table) evaluated at the sample mean nominal gain for 
those who experienced nominal gains of 0.135, or 13.5 percent gain. All 
specifications estimated with a full set of calendar year dummies. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Figure 1.  Kaplan-Meier Empirical Hazards by 
Type of Move
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